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No other section of the Bankruptcy Act seems available to the
trustee. If the transfer has been effected prior to bankruptcy, he has
no lien under Sec. 47 (a) 2; and his derivative powers under Sec.
70 (e), I I U.S.C.A. 107 (e), to exercise the rights of creditors under
state law would be applicable only to transfers made prior to four months
of bankruptcy and voidable under state law.
HOWARD W. NEFFNER.
JUSTIN H. FOLKERTH.
PRIORITY OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS IN BANKRUPTCY
The City of Lincoln, Nebraska, a municipal corporation, sought
priority in its claim of $45,000 with interest against the Lincoln Trust
Company, bankrupt. The City based its contention on-Sec. 64b(7) of
the Bankruptcy Act and also claimed that the bankrupt had custody of
the fund as a trust fund. The district court and the circuit court
decided that the city was not within Sec. 64b(7) and the circuit court
held that there was no trust fund. Held: that a city as a municipal
corporation is entitled to priority under Sec. 64b(7) if as a matter of
local law the municipality was accorded priority. The case was re-
manded to try the issue of local law. City of Lincoln, Neb. et al. v.
L. Z. Ricketts, Trustee, etc., 56 S. Ct. 507 (U.S. Law Wk. Mar. 3,
1936, Index 607).
For an adequate understanding of this problem, the history of state
and federal priority in bankruptcy is necessary. The United States is
accorded priority in insolvent debtor's estates by R.S. Sec. 3466-67
(31 U.S.C.A. 191-192) and sureties are subrogated to this priority by
R.S. Sec. 3468 (31 U.S.C.A. 193). This statute is the same in sub-
stance as that passed as early as 1797- It has been held that the United
States has no sovereign prerogative of priority but its priority is derived
solely from Congressional enactment. United States v. The State Bank
of North Carolina, 6 Pet. 29, 8 L. Ed. 308 (1832). The Supreme
Court has held that R.S. Sec. 3466-68 is in pari materia with the Bank-
ruptcy Act and that the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 relegates the priority
of R.S. Sec. 3466-68, if recognized at all in bankruptcy (which point
the court did not have to decide under the circumstances), to fifth place
in payment of claims under Sec. 64b(5) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898
(Now 64 b(7). Guarantee Title and Trust Go. v. Title Guarantee
and Surety Co., 224 U.S. 152 (1912).
Contrary to the view of some writers and lower courts, but support-
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ing a dissenting dictum in Matter of Eastern Shore Ship Building Corp.,
258 U.S. 549, 42 S. Ct. 386 (1922) the Supreme Court held in Davis
v. Pringle, 268 U. S. 315, 45 S. Ct. 549, 69 L. Ed. 794 (925) that
the United States was not a "person" under Sec. 64 b(5) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1898 and hence that the priority accorded it under R.S.
3466-68 had no effect in bankruptcy (tax claims being especially pro-
vided for in Sec. 64a).
A year later (1926) Congress, showing its preference for govern-
mental priority, overcame the rule of Davis v. Pringle, supra, by enact-
ing an amendment to Sec. 64b of the Bankruptcy Act. It created seven
classes of priority instead of the previous act's five. It stated, "The debts
to have priority, in advance of the payment of dividends to creditors,
and to be paid in full out of the bankrupt estate, and the order of pay-
ment shall be . . . . (7) debts owing to any person who by the laws
of the States or the United States is entitled to priority. Provided, That
the term 'person' as used in this section shall include corporations, the
United States and the several States and Territories of the United
States." See McLaughlin, "Amendments of Bankruptcy Act," 40
Harv. L.R. 341, 345. Recent federal cases now hold that for a debt
other than taxes, the United States priority under R.S. Sec. 3466-68 is
recognized under Sec. 64b(7). United States v. Kaplan, 7 4F (2d)
664 (i935). See In re Brannon, et a. 62 F. (2d) 959 (i933); In
re Hauger Go. 54 F. (2d) 117 (i93i).
The expansion of this judicial interpretation of Sec. 64b(7) in the
principal case to include municipal corporations seems entirely justifiable.
It would seem that it could have been justified even before the amend-
ment of 1926 which specifically includes corporations in the definition
of "person" in the proviso of Sec. 64b (7), since prior to that amend-
ment "person" as used in Sec. 64b (5) included corporations by virtue
of the definition of "person" in Sec. i (i 9). That a municipal corpora-
tion is a "corporation" under the Bankruptcy Act might at first be
doubted from the definition of a corporation under Sec. i (6). At first
glance, this definition seems limited to private as distinguished from
public business. But since this definition of Sec. i (6) in its broader
aspect includes almost all forms of aggregate business other than part-
nerships, and since, strictly speaking, the definition of Sec. 1(6)
(" 'corporations' shall mean all bodies having any of the powers and
privileges of private corporations not possessed by individuals or partner-
ships ....... ") includes municipal corporations, the conclusion of the
court that a municipal corporation is a "corporation" under the Bank-
ruptcy Act and therefore a person under Sec. 64b(7) seems correct.
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This conclusion is emphasized by Sec. 4a which in naming persons who
may be voluntary bankrupts states, "Any person except a municipal,
.... corporation . . . . "; and by Sec. 4 b which in naming those
who may be adjudged involuntary bankrupts states, ". . . . corpora-
tion except a municipal, .... .corporation." This exception of munic-
ipal corporations to the term "person" in Sec. 4a and to the term
"corporation" in Sec. 4 b would seem to indicate a legislative intent that
both "person" and "corporation" otherwise include municipal corpora-
tions. Gity of Lincoln, Neb. v. Ricketts, supra, at p. 5o8, 509.
Whether other political subdivisions such as counties and special
districts would be entitled to priority under Sec. 64 b(7) admits of
greater doubt. Although they are often distinguished as municipal
quasi corporations, still the generic term municipal corporation is broad
enough to include them. McQuillan, "Municipal Corporations," Sec.
135; Dillon, "Municipal Corporations," Sec. 32. Congressional favor-
ing of governmental priority as evidenced in the aforementioned legisla-
tive overruling of Davis v. Pringle, supra, might aid in construing the
term "corporations" to include these political subdivisions. On the other
hand the omission of the words, "county, district, or municipality" in-
cluded in the tax priority of Sec. 64a from Sec. 64 b( 7 ) might be con-
strued as a legislative intention to exclude counties and districts from
priority other than taxes under the Bankruptcy Act. See McLaughlin
"Amendments to the Bankruptcy Act," 4o Harv. Law Rev. 341, 345.
In the principal case, the latter argument was rejected (p. 509) in
view of the express inclusion of "corporations" in Sec. 64 b( 7 ). Sim-
ilarly if counties and special districts are construed as "corporations" as
indicated above, the argument of their omission from Sec. 64 b(7) would
not be controlling.
Although, by the holding of the principal case, municipal corpora-
tions are entitled to priority in bankruptcy, if by local law they are
accorded a priority, it is doubtful whether they have the latter in absence
of state statute specifically according them such a priority. This is
because many states do not recognize common law sovereign preroga-
tive in insolvency proceedings. See, Crane, "A Royal Prerogative," 34
V. Va. L.Q. 317 (1928). Ohio denies its existence in bank failure
cases in which either state or municipal funds are involved. The Fidelity
& Casualty Co. of New York v. The Union Savings Bank Co. et al.,
1I9 Ohio St. 124 (1928). Village of Warrensville Heights v. Fulton,
Supt. of Banks, 128 Oh. St. 192 (1934). And of those states which
recognize such a common law sovereign prerogative, the vast majority
hold that it cannot be delegated to a political subdivision. It cannot be
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delegated to a drainage district: William R. Compton Co. v. Farme's
Trust Co., 279 S.W. 746 (Mo. App., 1925); nor to a county: Glynn
County v. Brunswick Terminal Co., ioI Ga. 244, 28 S.E. 604
(1897); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Brumell, State Supt. of
Banks, 12F(2d) 307 (1926); Phillips v. Yates Center National Bank
(Phillips v. Gillis) 98 Kan. 383, 158 Pac. 23, L.R.A. 19 17A, 68o
(1916); nor to a municipal corporation: People v. Home State Bank
of Grant Park, 338 II1. 179, 17o N.E. 205 (1930); In re Northern
Bank, 85 Misc. 594, 148 N.Y.S. 70 (1914) aff'd. 163 App. Div. 974,
148 N.Y.S. 70 (1914) further aff'd. 212 N.Y. 6o8, io6 N.E. 749
( 1914) ; United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Rainey, I 2o Tenn.
357, 113 S.W. 397 (1907); contra Denver v. Stenger, 295 Fed. 809
(1924). A political subdivision has been distinguished from an agency
of the state, such as a university, the latter being entitled to exercise the
state's common law sovereign prerogative. University of Tennessee v.
Peoples Bank, et al., 157 Tenn. 87, 6 S.W. (2d) 328.
JUsTIN H. FOLKERTH.
WHAT CONSTITUTES A FARMER UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY
ACT?
On May 15, 1935, section 4 b of the bankruptcy act was amended
to provide, "Any natural person, except a wage earner or a farmer,
* . . may be adjudged an involuntary bankrupt upon default or an
impartial trial, and shall be subject to the provisions and entitled to the
benefits of this title."' At the same time section 75r was amended to
provide, "For the purposes of this section, section 4 b, and section 74,
the term 'farmer' includes2 not only an individual who is primarily bona
fide personally engaged in producing products of the soil, but also any
individual who is primarily bona fide personally engaged in dairy farm-
ing, the production of poultry or livestock, or the production of poultry
products or livestock products in their unmanufactured state, or the
IBankruptcy Act, sec. 4b, 49 Stat. 246, II U.S.C.A. sec. 22b. (1935);
formerly "Any natural person, except a wage earner or a person engaged
chiefly in farming or the tillage of the soil . . . .may be adjudged an
involuntary bankrupt." Bankruptcy Act of 1898, sec. 4 b, 30 Stat. 547, I1
U.S.C.A., sec. Z2b.
2 The United States Supreme Court recently held that the word "include"
was not a term of exclusion, as used in section i (9), defining a creditor.
American Surety Co. of New York v. Mariotta, 287 U.S. 513, 77 L.Ed. 466,
53 S. Ct. 238.
